Posted: June 24th, 2022

Compare And Contrast The Leadership And Communication Techniques

Compare And Contrast The Leadership And Communication Techniques Of Former Al Qaeda Leader Osama bin Laden
We have been focusing upon how those at the top of terrorist groups perform leadership roles and influence various audiences (both within their organizations and to the world at large). For this research paper compare and contrast the leadership and communication techniques of former al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden with those of one other terrorist leader. Select one other terrorist leader from al Qaeda or affiliated groups such as Zawahiri, Baghdadi or Awlaki to compare and contrast with bin Laden’s leadership and communication approaches. Include and state the topic question as presented.

Ayman al-Zawahiri (al Qaeda successor of Osama bin Laden)

Gohel, S. M. (2017) Deciphering Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda’s strategic and ideological imperatives. Perspectives on Terrorism, 11 (1). pp. 54-67. ISSN 2334-3745. http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/86743/1/Gohel_Deciphering Al-Qaeda_2018.pdf

Ayman al-Zawahiri (2020). The Counter Extremist Project. https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/ayman-al-zawahiri

Sude, B. (2015, September). Assessing Al-Qa`ida Central’s Resilience. https://ctc.usma.edu/assessing-al-qaida-centrals-resilience/

Council on Foreign Relations. (2011, July 14). Profile: Ayman al-Zawahiri. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/profile-ayman-al-zawahiri

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (former Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham [ISIS] leader)

McCants, W. (2015, September 1). The Believer. http://csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2015/thebeliever.html

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (2020). The Counter Extremist Project. https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi

Atwan, A. B. (2015). A Portrait of Caliph Ibrahim. The Cato Review. https://www.thecairoreview.com/essays/a-portrait-of-caliph-ibrahim/

Anwar al-Awlaki (former al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader, online jihadist radicalizer)

Shane, S. (2017). The Enduring Influence of Anwar al-Awlaki in the Age of the Islamic State. https://ctc.usma.edu/the-enduring-influence-of-anwar-al-awlaki-in-the-age-of-the-islamic-state/

Anwar al-Awlaki (2020). The Counter Extremist Project. https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/anwar-al-awlaki

Zimmerman, K. (2010, March 12). Militant Islam’s Global Preacher: The Radicalizing Effect of Sheikh Anwar al Awlaki. Critical Threats. https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/militant-islams-global-preacher-the-radicalizing-effect-of-sheikh-anwar-al-awlaki

Assignment Specifics:

The body of your report is to be at least FOUR FULL pages in length (not counting title page and references) and is to contain the following:
A brief and stated “introduction”, with the topic and your thesis
A main body, containing the “meat” of the paper, where you provide the requested information supported by class readings and with your analysis
A stated “conclusion”, summarizing your information clearly and concisely
Technical Requirements

Your paper must be at a minimum of 4-6 pages (the Title and Reference pages do not count towards the minimum limit).
Scholarly and credible references should be used. A good rule of thumb is at least 2 scholarly sources per page of content.
Type in Times New Roman, 12 point and double space.
Students will follow the current APA Style as the sole citation and reference style used in written work submitted as part of coursework.
Points will be deducted for the use of Wikipedia or encyclopedic type sources. It is highly advised to utilize books, peer-reviewed journals, articles, archived documents, etc.
All submissions will be graded using the assignment rubric.
Introduction
Al Qaeda has been a distinct terrorist organization in its organization and structure (Gillon, 2021). This would be attributed to the primary leaders leading their operations. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri co-founded Al-Qaeda in 1988 which bin Laden would be considered its leader. Bin Laden’s popularity as the organization’s leader skyrocketed after the 9/11 attacks (Bergen, 2011). He asserted that his militant group was the representative of Islam and that America was the crusaders bent on religious war. Fast forward, Al-Zawahiri would take up the leadership mantle for the terrorist group since 2011 after bin Laden’s death. Notably, the leadership and communication techniques adopted by the two leaders have demonstrated some similar and different traits to attain its primary objective of being the jihadist group able to form a global caliphate.
This research essay intends to compare and contrast the leadership and communication techniques of the former al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden with those of his successor al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda’s leadership through its co-founders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, has undergone different motions of either the leaders taking up similar or different approaches depending on the issues they were handling.
The Leadership And Communication Techniques Of Former Al Qaeda Leader Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri
The leadership approaches taken up by bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri has focussed on calling for revolutionary change in the Islamic societies. They have intended to establish a model of governance where the Muslim persons have been empowered to select and depose their leaders as per the Islamic principles and traditions of consultation, also known as shura. It is, however, prudent to note that bin Laden argues explicitly that all Muslims needed to embark on reforms that were in line with the religious laws. The adherence and enforcement of the organization’s particular interpretation of the religious laws would hence be the criteria by which the secular and Islamist parties would be judged. Despite the two having their leadership and communication approaches, their intentions remain unaltered.
Both bin Laden and Zawahiri advocated for the global caliphate as its long-term objective (Glenn, 2015). The leaders have used the notion as a motivational tool instead of an immediate purpose. In the early 21st century, during bin Laden’s rule, the militant group’s affiliates proposed the establishment of caliphates in Yemen and Iraq. However, the leader also cautioned that it was not the appropriate time, and the attempts had a higher possibility of failing. Particular conditions needed to be fulfilled before declaring a caliphate. In 2005, Zawahiri asserted that the first condition was expelling Americans from Iraq (Bajoria & Hudson, 2006). As of mid-2015, when the militant group was already under Zawahiri, it had not tried to capture land that would form a state (Glenn, 2015). Their operatives set up bases in Afghanistan, Yemen, and other nations, with no attempts to govern them. The global caliphate would remain a motivation tool for both leaders in their operations.
The decision-making and execution processes under the two leaders have demonstrated both similarities and differences. Their input towards the decisions and actions was significant but varied. Bin Laden adopted the unique management structure, encompassing the centralization of decisions and the decentralization of execution (Sude, 2017). Generally, bin Laden would assess the feasibility of the proposed missions and determine their strategic value before providing funds and institutional support to the plots he approved. Notably, he allowed his deputies to execute the mission hos they deemed fit. According to bin Laden’s bodyguards, Nasser al-Bahri, the persons who developed the attack plans could go past the entity’s bureaucracy and directly present their proposals to bin Laden and the senior commanders. Either bin Laden or a trusted deputy could judge if the proposed attack were in line with the group’s military strategy. If approved, then responsibility would be delegated to subordinates for planning and execution processes.
Conversely, Zawahiri’s leadership has mainly followed a decentralized approach such authority primarily rests in the hands of the affiliate leaders within the militant groups (Bomfim, 2020). Zawahiri would broker mergers with several Islamist groups and also sanction the creation of several al-Qaeda affiliates such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Nusra Front. The leader has not claimed to have direct hierarchical control of the currently vast and networked structure (Counter Extremism Project, 2022). Its primary leadership was looking to centralize the messaging and strategy for the organization instead of managing the daily operations of the franchises. However, the former affiliates must consult with the primary leadership before executing the large-scale attacks. It would be evident that the decision-making and execution process became more decentralized during Zawahiri’s leadership, with the senior leaders’ input required only during the significant attacks (Counter Extremism Project, 2022). Also, considering that the militant group established a shura council and committees, these would be required to deal with the military operations, financing, and information sharing.
Bin Laden held onto one self-perpetuating mythology in his leadership, which he carefully crafted and communicated skillfully (Hoffman, 2015). He asserted that the United States was a hegemonic power that opposed changes, propped up Israel, and corrupted and reprobated regimes not to exist unless they had backing from Americans. Since the United States could not incur the costs of pain and losses from terrorist attacks, bin Lad believed that terrorist attacks against the country and its allied Western countries would be feasible (Hoffman, 2015). The leader identified this weakness from how the United States withdrew from Lebanon after the bombings at its marine barracks in 1983 and when the United States withdrew from Somalia after the killing of eighteen American Army Rangers and Delta Force commandos. Bin Laden called for any and all Muslims globally to kill any and all Americans that are both civilians and military individuals regardless of the country as long as it was possible to do it (Porter, 2002). It was evident that bin Laden incorporated a more international look in his fight for jihad.
Conversely, Zawahiri adopted a more local outlook in carrying out the militant groups’ activities. He prioritized courses of action local to the Arab and Islamic worlds, which included countering the Iranian-sponsored Shiite militias in Iraq regardless of the existing ambiguous relationship. He supported the Taliban in Afghanistan out of necessity and opposed the apostate regimes such as those in Egypt and Syria (Gohel, 2017). He considered these strategic priorities need to be done despite the constant calls or attacks against the West and specifically the United States from al-Qaeda supporters. Zawahiri believed that it was not sufficient to undertake the trans-national attacks solely. A proper strategy was needed to ensure that the militant group and the affiliates possess safe bases wiu6h the Arab and Islamic world. With time, Zawahiri has prohibited external operations in the West to rebuild with no interference. This would entail the adoption of three pillars specifically: strengthening the decentralized franchise through streamlined communication between them to establish an all-encompassing grand strategy (Bomfim, 2020). The second pillar was him issuing an order in 2013 calling for the avoidance of mass casualty operations, specifically those that could kill Muslim civilians (Bomfim, 2020). The third pillar focused on rebuilding the organization’s military strength and letting ISIS absorb all blows coming from the Coalition organization that is fighting it.
Bin Laden himself was mainly the centralized figure that would oversee the Business Committed that has over time developed and continues to oversee the entity’s extensive and complex global financial resources (Post, 2002). This committee constitutes professional bankers,m financiers, and accountants that coordinate the organization’s vast financial empire. Conversely, Zawahiri would be the head of the Islamic Studies Committee. It constitutes several Islamic scholars and religious clerics whose main objective is issuing the entity’s Fatwas, among other formal writings (Post, 2002). While there are minimal writings related to the latter committees, they are fundamental to the maintenance and generation of support from the many followers that have subscribed to their ideologies.
Regarding the communication techniques, the two leaders have intentionally used master narratives as a means for propagating their ideologies and furthering their agendas (Bockstette, 2012). The group’s main aim has been to exploit the deeply ingrained belief systems based on ethnic, religious, and cultural identities for mastering support for the ultimate strategic objectives. This would include attacking the high-profile symbolic targets capable of provoking the enemy governments to over-react and harm their long-term desires such that the organization ends up strategically profiting (Bockstette, 2012). Sensitizing the masses to earn the support of sympathizers or generate fear, the leaders understood that publicity was required. Peter Bergen, CNN analysts of terrorism and author of Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of bin Laden, did the first television interview of bin Laden in 1997, where he discovered that within his Afghani base, the leader had a well thought out mediatic strategy (Gianluigi CESTA, n.d.). It was fundamental that the Sheik needed to know the questions, and then bin Laden would reply r only to those considered suitable for the interview. Zawahiri, the successor of bin Laden, has always considered the manifold benefits of utilizing the International Media to call attention to their cause (Gianluigi CESTA, n.d.). Therefore, when Al Qaeda declares war, it does it publicly through official platforms. Zawahiri was also sure that the successfully televising images from attacks spread widespread fear among the people while simultaneously encouraging “martyrs to come forward and take part in the suicide missions in the name of the Islamist cause.”
Conclusion
Al-Qaeda’s leadership through its co-founders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, has undergone different motions of either the leaders taking up similar or different approaches depending on the issues they were handling. While the two leaders have been working towards a similar objective, they adopted a distinct decision-making process, engaged with distinct departments, and focussed on different regions. Regarding communication, the two understood the importance and use of international media to propagate their agendas. Ultimately, the two leaders have established the al-Qaeda terrorist group as one of the widespread and famous terrorist groups.

References
Bajoria, J., & Hudson, L. (2006, February 2). Profile: Ayman al-zawahiri. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/profile-ayman-al-zawahiri
Bergen, P. (2011). Where will Zawahiri take al-Qaeda? Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/zawahiri-al-qaedas-new-leader-probably-cant-save-the-struggling-group/2011/06/16/AGZKeMZH_story.html
Bockstette, C. (2012). A Clausewitzian Attack on Jihadi Communication Strategy. Air University School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Maxwell AFB United States.
Bomfim, S. (2020, June 5). Al Qaeda: From hierarchical to decentralized organization. Retrieved from https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/9a81980efcf04a6dbe003df94b300297
Counter Extremism Project. (2022). Ayman al-zawahiri. Retrieved from https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/ayman-al-zawahiri
Gianluigi CESTA. (n.d.). Al Qaeda and the media. Communication strategies. Retrieved from https://gnosis.aisi.gov.it/gnosis/Rivista29.nsf/ServNavigE/17
Gillon, J. (2021, May 13). From bin Laden to al-zawahiri: The story of al-Qaeda’s rise. Retrieved from https://www.theafricareport.com/85342/from-bin-laden-to-al-zawahiri-the-story-of-al-qaedas-rise/
Glenn, C. (2015). Al Qaeda V ISIS: Leaders & structure. Retrieved from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-qaeda-v-isis-leaders-structure
Gohel, S. M. (2017). Deciphering Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda’s strategic and ideological imperatives. Perspectives on terrorism, 11(1), 54-67.
Hoffman, B. (2015, August 25). The leadership secrets of Osama bin Laden. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/04/the-leadership-secrets-of-osama-bin-laden/302702/
Porter, J. M. B. (2002). Osama Bin-Laden, jihad, and the sources of international terrorism. Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev., 13, 871.
Post, J. M. (2002). Killing in the Name of God: Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. USAF Counterproliferation Center Maxwell AFB al.
Sude, B. (2017, November 16). Assessing al-qa`ida central’s resilience. Retrieved from https://ctc.usma.edu/assessing-al-qaida-centrals-resilience/

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